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UMBRELLA EQUITIES: USE OF THE
FEDERAL COMMON LAW OF NUISANCE
TO CATCH THE FALL OF ACID RAIN
DOUGLAS LIND*
Acid rain is emerging as one of the world's most serious environ-
mental problems.' The result of a complex chemical interaction be-
tween sulfur and nitrogen oxides and atmospheric water vapor, acid
rain is precipitation of far above normal acidity.3 Prior to chemical
transformation, the pollutants causing acid rain may travel hundreds
or even thousands of miles from their emitting source.4 Interstate or
* B.A., University of Minnesota, 1978; J.D., Washington University, 1981.
1. President's Message to the Congress on Environmental Priorities and Pro-
grams, 15 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 1353, 1372 (Aug. 2, 1979).
2. Throughout the course of this Note, "acid rain" will serve as a generic term
covering all forms of acid precipitation. The phenomenon occurs in snow, mist, and
sleet as well as rain. Dumanoski, Acid Rain, SIERRA, May/June 1980, at 38. Use of
the term add rain merely reflects common usage; the importance of the phenome-
non's other modes is not meant to be downplayed. It is equally troublesome in those
regards. In fact, "acid stresses," accompanying large thaws of acid snow, provide a
much greater threat of massive fish kills than does acid rain. Wetstone, Air Pollution
Control Laws in North America and The Problem of Acid Rain and Snow, 10 ENVT'L
L. REP. 50001, 50002 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Wetstone]. Discontinuous age struc-
tures of fish may result if the thawing occurs at spawning time. Id.
3. Dumanoski, supra note 2, at 38.
4. Graves, Rain ofTroubles, SCIENCE 80, July/August 1980, at 75. See also ENVI-
RONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, RESEARCH SUMMARY: ACID RAIN 3 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as EPA SUMMARY] (various sulfuric compounds which may turn
into sulfuric acid are known to travel as much as several hundred kilometers per day
in the atmosphere); Robinson, Acid Rain---The Crossroads/or Decision Making, 30 J.
AIR POLL. CONT. A. 106, 106 (1980) (atmospheric studies show pollutants may travel
thousands of miles).
5. Wetstone, supra note 2, at 50001. See notes 57-58 and accompanying text infra.
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even international6 transportation is common.
Federal statutory pollution control in the United States inade-
quately controls interstate transport of acid rain pollutants. The Acid
Precipitation Act of 1980' directly confronts the problem, but only
with research appropriations and a policy of amelioration.8 In the
Clean Air Act,9 Congress substantively addressed the problem of in-
terstate air pollution.'" The Act's interstate provisions, however, are
limited in scope." They are not broad enough to embrace acid
rain. 12
Parties injured by acid rain originating in another state are not,
however, without legal recourse. This Note will propose use of the
See also St. Louis Post-Dispatch, May 4, 1980, at 12A, col. 1 (EPA has tracked sulfur
dioxide-bearing smoke clouds from St. Louis to Minnesota).
6. Graves, supra note 4, at 75. Acid rain first received documentation as an envi-
ronmental problem because of its international effects. 8 COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMEN-
TAL QUALITY ANN. REP. 195 (1977). A Swedish study in 1972 showed a marked
increase in rainfall acidity in Sweden due in large part to pollutants transported there
from other European countries. ROYAL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ROYAL
MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, Air Pollution Across National Boundaries: The Impact
on the Environment ofSulfur inAir and Precipitation, SWEDEN'S CASE STUDY FOR THE
UNITED STATES CONFERENCE ON THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT (1972), cited in 8
COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ANN. REP. 195 (1977). It is estimated that
77% of the sulfur in the atmosphere over southern Sweden which is the result of
human activity originates outside its borders. Likens, Wright, Galloway, and Butler,
AcidRain, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, October 1979, at 43, 47 [hereinafter cited as Lik-
ens]. One Swedish scientist has labelled the acid rain problem a "chemical war."
TIME, March 17, 1980, at 48. Other Western European countries similarly have lev-
elled transfrontier pollution charges. Id.
In North America, the United States and Canada exchange over two million tons of
acid rain causing pollutants each year. Dumanoski, supra note 2, at 41. Although
Canada receives the greater percentage of the pollutants, id., the transboundary ef-
fects are felt on both sides of the border. See Minneapolis Tribune, Mar. 3, 1978, at 1,
col. 1 (environmentalists fear acid rain damage to Boundary Waters Canoe Area of
northern Minnesota from proposed coal-fired power plant at Atikokan, Ontario).
The two countries have responded by agreeing to enter into a formal treaty to control
the problem. [1980] 11 ENVIR. REp. (BNA) (11 Envir. Rep. Current Dev.) 549. The
Canadian Parliament has also approved legislation giving the Canadian government
power to abate transnational air pollution. [1981] 11 ENviR. REP. (BNA) (11 Envir.
Rep. Current Dev.) 1761.
7. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 8901-8905 (Pamph. 1980).
8. See notes 69-85 and accompanying text infra.
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. III 1979).
10. Clean Air Act, §§ 110(a)(2)(E), 126, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410(a)(2)(E), 7426 (Supp.
III 1979).
11. See notes 108-12 & 130-41 and accompanying text infra.
12. Id.
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federal common law of nuisance as an alternative non-statutory solu-
tion to the acid rain problem. Following examination of the scope of
acid rain pollution and of the inadequacy of federal statutory solu-
tions, this Note will discuss the prospect of a federal nuisance law
remedy. It will examine a number of recurring federal nuisance law
problems and conclude that this common law alternative provides
the most effective remedy for acid rain pollution.
I. THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEM: ACID RAIN
Natural precipitation is to a limited extent acidic.' 3 Its chemical
composition varies depending upon the relative amounts of certain
atmospheric substances it contains.14 It becomes increasingly acidic
to the proportionate extent it combines with sulfur or nitrogen oxides
or hydrogen sulfide.' 5 Highly acidic natural rainfall may result from
the release of sulfur dioxide and hydrogen sulfide gases into the at-
mosphere from natural sources such as volcanoes.' 6 Most studies of
precipitation which fell prior to the Industrial Revolution, however,
indicate natural rainfall contains relatively low levels of acidity.' 7
The increased atmospheric emissions of sulfur and nitrogen oxides
attending the urbanization and industrialization of North America
and Europe have significantly augmented precipitation acidity. 8
Large-scale fossil fuel combustion from both stationary and mobile
sources emits massive amounts' 9 of sulfur20 and nitrogen2' oxide
13. Graves, supra note 4, at 76.
14. Likens, supra note 6, at 43.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. But see Wall Street Journal, Oct. 1, 1980, at 24, col. I (scientists find ice
samples up to 350 years old containing high levels of acidity).
18. Likens, supra note 6, at 43.
19. The EPA estimates that approximately 50 million metric tons of sulfur and
nitrogen oxides are discharged into the atmosphere each year in the United States
alone. EPA SUMMARY, supra note 4, at 1.
20. Sulphur oxiodes (SOO) are principally discharged from stationary sources. Id.
at 2. Coal-fired electric generating plants (especially those using high sulfur coal) and
smelting operations are the primary sources of sulfur emissions. Babich, Davis, &
Stotzky, Acid Precipitation: Causes and Consequences, ENVIRONMENT, May 1980, at 7
[hereinafter cited as Babich]. An estimated 70 percent of the SO, discharged in the
United States is from electrical generation. Wetstone, supra note 2, at 50001 n.9.
21. All types of fossil fuel combustion produce nitrogen oxide (NOr). Babich,
supra note 20, at 7. Thus, not only does coal and oil combustion by industrial and
utility plants create nitrogen oxide, but gasoline combustion in motor vehicles con-
19811
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gases into the atmosphere. After drifting with the prevailing winds,
these gases chemically transmute into particles or acids.22 Dry depo-
sition occurs when the gases or particles return to earth prior to con-
tact with moisture. 3 Although the process is little understood,24
scientists believe these particles and gases acidify upon contact with
water following deposition.'
Wet deposition comprises the process commonly referred to as acid
rain. 26 Following emission into the atmosphere, the sulfuric and ni-
trogenous gases chemically combine with atmospheric moisture.27
Carried by the winds to atmospheric gathering points, the resultant
sulfuric and nitric acids 28 fall to earth in rain or snow.
The effects of acid rain vary with the receptive area.29 Since depo-
sition may occur after hundreds of miles of transport, the receptive
environment may differ greatly from that of the emitting source.
Acid rain directly affects urban environments in a number of ways.
It damages paint on buildings and automobiles,3" and deteriorates
steel and works of art.' Cement and marble structures, including
statues and monuments, corrode more rapidly when subjected to acid
rains.32 Moreover, the long-term leaching effects of acid rain may
tributes as well. Id. In fact, an estimated 40 percent of all NO, emissions in the
United States in 1977 were from transportation-related sources. EPA SUMMARY,
supra note 4, at 2.
22. Dumanoski, supra note 2, at 39. See McBean, Aci Rain: Emissions, Atmos-
pheric Transport, Transformation and Depositions, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACTION
SEMINAR ON ACID PRECIPITATION 9, 11-13 (1979) [hereinafter cited as ACTION
SEMINAR].
23. Likens, supra note 6, at 48.
24. Dumanoski, supra note 2, at 39.
25. EPA SUMMARY, supra note 4, at 3. Dry deposition is believed to occur nearer
the polluting source than wet deposition. Likens, supra note 6, at 48.
26. EPA SUMMARY, supra note 4, at 3.
27. Likens, supra note 6, at 43.
28. There are other acids that contribute to acid rain. For example, hydrocloric
acid may result from coal-fired power plants. EPA SUMMARY, supra note 4, at 2.
Sulfuric and nitric acids contribute, however, by far the largest proportion. Id.
29. 8 COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ANN. REP. 197 (1977); Glass,
Glass, and Rennie, Effects ofAcid Precopation, 13 ENVT'L SCIENCE AND TECH. 1350,
1351 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Glass] (nature and properties of affected materials
must be considered in determining potential impact of acid rain-causing emissions).
30. Wetstone, supra note 2, at 50002.
31. 10 COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ANN. REP. 71 (1979).
32. EPA SUMMARY, supra note 4, at 1; Gauri & Holdren, Pollutant Effects on
Stone Monuments, 15 ENvT"L SCIENCE & TECH. 386, 386 (1981). Ancient classical
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raise to harmful levels the amount of trace metals in drinking water
supplies.33
Acid rain's deleterious effects upon the natural environment are
even more pronounced. Often they are irreversible,34 threatening the
ecological system which supports human life.35 Acid rain threatens
destruction of sensitive virgin forests36 and corrodes the protective
surface structures of plant leaves, making them susceptible to envi-
ronmental and biotic stresses.37 It causes leaching of acid nutrients,
resulting in decreased soil fertility and troublesome host-parasite as-
sociations.38 Agricultural productivity decreases in areas of heavy
buildings on the Acropolis, including the Parthenon, are deteriorating much more
rapidly this century than heretofore as a result of high air pollution levels in Athens.
EPA SUMMARY, supra note 4, at 1. Completion of an oil refinery in India is expected
to similarly deface the Taj Mahal. Gauri & Holdren, supra, at 386. The EPA is
currently studying the effects of acid rain on stone by observing the rates of decay of
standard Veteran's Administration headstones at a number of national cemeteries
across the country. EPA SUMMARY, supra note 4, at 12.
33. 10 COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ANN. REP. 71 (1979). Accord,
Fuhs, A Contribution to the Assessment of Health Effects ofAcid Precipitation, in Ac-
TION SEMINAR, supra note 22, at 113, 115 (acid rain can leach copper and lead con-
centrations equal to federal drinking water standards from natural soil and rock
formations alone). See also [1979] 10 ENvIR. REP. (BNA) (10 Envir. Rep. Current
Dev.) 1168 (pipes corroded by acid rain may contaminate drinking water).
34. See Robinson, Acid Rain-The Crossroads/or Decision Making, 30 J. AIR.
POLL. CONT. A. 106, 106 (1980).
35. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, May 4, 1980, at 12A, col. 1. Scientists disagree on
whether acid rain poses a direct threat to human health. Compare Fuhs, A Contribu-
tion to the Assessment of Health Effects ofAcid Precpitation, in ACTION SEMINAR,
supra note 22, at 113, 113 (acid rain is probably harmless as a direct threat to health)
and McCarroll, Health Effects Associated with Increased Use of Coal, 30 J. AIR POLL.
CONT. A. 652, 654 (1980) (human ammonia production through respiratory tract se-
cretions fully neutralizes all sulfuric acid inhaled before it reaches the lungs) with
Hamilton, Health Effects ofAcid Precipitation, in ACTION SEMINAR, supra note 22, at
117, 126-27 (dry acid precipitation presently accounts for over two percent of the
deaths annually in both the United States and Canada) and Rowe, Human Exposure
to Sulfates from Coal-Fired Power Plants, 30 J. AIR POLL. CoNT. A. 682, 682 (1980)
(health damage formerly attributed to sulfur dioxide is probably caused by acid par-
ticulate sulfates).
36. See EPA SUMMARY, supra note 4, at 9 (acid rain a threat to virgin white pine
forests of northern Minnesota); Rennie, Dangers to Soils and Vegetation, in ACTION
SEMINAR, supra note 22, at 24, 26-27 (acid rain poses a long-term threat to Boreal
forest ecosystem of eastern Canada). For a discussion of the overall effects of acid
rain on forest ecosystems, see Varsbney and Garg, Plant Responses to Sufur Dioxide
Pollution, 9 CRITICAL REVIEWS IN ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL 27, 38 (1979).
37. Varshney, supra note 36, at 29 (1979).
38. Id. at 44. See also 8 COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ANN. REP. 198
1981]
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acidic deposition,39 and chemically dormant metals in the environ-
ment mobilize into toxic states.40 Furthermore, it can make lakes
with low buffering capacity41 so acidic that fish reproduction is im-
possible.42 Over time, this may result in a lake becoming totally inca-
pable of supporting fish life,43 or even in the extinction of entire
aquatic species."
Although global in outreach, acid rain is a regional environmental
problem.45 Within the United States, studies evince rainfall of above
normal acidity has fallen in the Northeast for at least twenty-five
years.46 Although nationwide data on the chemistry of rainfall re-
mains scarce,4 7 recent studies show an increase in precipitation acid-
ity in most parts of the country.48 This increase is most pronounced
in the rapidly industrializing Southeast,49 the major highly mobile
(1977) (acid rain affects important nitrogen-fixing bacteria which help replenish soil
nitrogen essential to the growth of agricultural crops and trees).
39. EPA SUMMARY, supra note 4, at 10-12.
40. See Fuhs, A Contribution to the Assessment of Health Effects ofcid Prec(pita.
lion, in ACTION SEMINAR, supra note 22, at 113, 115 ("actionable levels" of mercury
found in fish from remote lakes in Adirondack Mountains of New York); Wetstone,
supra note 2, at 50002 (plant and fish contamination by acid rain-mobilized metals
poses a threat to health and the sport fishing industry).
41. A lake's buffering capacity is its ability to neutralize acids introduced into it.
Waters low in acid-neutralizing minerals and consequently most susceptible to dam-
age from acid rain tend to be high altitude and upstream lakes and streams. 8 COUN-
CIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ANN. REP. 198 (1977).
42. Graves, supra note 4, at 76. See generally Hendrey, Acidification of Aquatic
Ecosystems: Ecosystem Sensitivity and Biological Consequences, in ACTION SEMINAR,
supra note 22, at 72, 72-79.
43. Babich, supra note 20, at 11-12. Roughly one hundred lakes in the Adiron-
dacks can no longer support fish populations due to acid rain. Wetstone, supra note
2, at 50002. See also EPA SUMMARY, supra note 4, at 9 (lakes in Upper Michigan and
northern Minnesota and Wisconsin may be as susceptible to acid rain as those in the
Adirondacks).
44. Wetstone, supra note 2, at 50003. It is suspected that at least one fish species,
the aurora trout, has become extinct due to acid rain. See ONTARIO MINISTRY OF
THE ENVIRONMENT, NORTHEAST REGION, LIMNOLOGICAL OBSERVATION ON THE
AURORA TROUT LAKES (1978), cited in Wetstone, supra note 2, at 50003.
45. See Shinn and Lynn, Do Man-Made Sources Affect the Sulfur Cycle ofNorth-
eastern States? 13 ENVT'L SCI. & TECH. 1062, 1062 (1979).
46. Likens, supra note 6, at 48.
47. Id.
48. Glass, supra note 29, at 1351.
49. Likens, supra note 6, at 49.
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Western cities,5" and the northern Great Lakes states.5 '
Acid rain's regional impact nonetheless remains greatest in the
Northeast.52 High levels of sulfur dioxide in the atmosphere have
caused extensive rain-induced environmental damage.5 3 The acidic
rains have also forced curtailment of industrial development. 4
Damage to the region's economy is pervasive;55 in some sectors the
loss may be total.56
Studies indicate much of the Northeast's acid rain problem
originates outside its borders.57 Over one-third of the pollutants have
been traced to the Midwest,58 principally Ohio. 9 Midwestern states,
motivated by economic factors, continue to encourage utility coal
conversion and combustion of locally-mined high sulfur coal.6" This
exacerbates the Northeast's acid rain problem. To date, attempts by
50. Glass, supra note 29, at 1351. Studies have shown a marked increase, for
example, in the acidity of rainfall in Pasadena, California since the 1960's. Graves,
supra note 4, at 77. Although most of this increase is thought to come from local
sources, it is suspected part of it originates as far away as Japan or China. Id. See
also Lewis & Grant, Acid Precipitation in the Western United States, SCIENCE, Janu-
ary 1980, at 176-77 (high acid content found in streams in Colorado Rockies).
51. EPA SUMMARY, supra note 4, at 8-9. Accord, Glass, supra note 29, at 1352
(lake acidification in the Boundary Waters Canoe Area-Voyagers National Park re-
gion of northern Minnesota has begun, with most sensitive lakes already affected);
Minneapolis Tribune, Aug. 18, 1980, at IA, col. 4 (acid rain problems detected at Isle
Royale National Park in Upper Michigan).
52. Glass, supra note 29, at 1351.
53. Id.
54. [1980] 10 ENvIR. REP. (BNA) (10 Envir. Rep. Current Dev.) 1928 (environ-
mental commissioners from six Northeastern states inform Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) Administrator that long-range pollutant transport from upwind states,
principally Ohio, is forcing them to curb industrial development).
55. Former Secretary of State Muskie has warned the Northeastern states that
coal conversion by other states will heighten the region's acid rain problem to the
point of inhibiting economic growth. Id. at 2327. See also [1980] 11 ENVIR. REP.
(BNA) (11 Envir. Rep. Current Dev.) 732 (economist estimates annual national loss
from acid rain at $5 billion); TIME, March 17, 1980, at 48 (structural damage alone
may be as high as $2 billion).
56. [1980] 11 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) (I 1 Envir. Rep. Current Dev.) 732 (fishermen,
resort owners, and resort towns in northern New York may suffer total economic loss
from acid rain).
57. [1980] 10 ENvIR. REP. (BNA) (10 Envir. Rep. Current Dev.) 2147-48 (testi-
mony of former EPA Administrator Douglas Costle before Senate subcommittee).
58. Id. at 2148.
59. Id. at 1928. See generally Dumanoski, supra note 2, at 43-45.
60. [1980] 10 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) (10 Envir. Rep. Current Dev.) 2239-40.
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Northeastern states to negotiate an "equitable" solution with the
Midwest have failed.6  They may next seek judicial recourse. 62 This
Note now turns to the prospects for success of such action.
II. FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW
A. Acid Precoiitation Act of 1980
Congress expressed recognition of the impending severity of acid
rain pollution by passing the Acid Precipitation Act of 1980.63 Be-
lieving that once acid rain becomes fully understood Americans will
willingly pay the price of abatement,' and recognizing the close rela-
tionship between energy production and environmental degrada-
tion,65 Congress enacted the acid rain measure as Title VII of the
Energy Security Act.66 Title I of the Energy Security Act creates a
61. See id. at 1928, 2239.
62. The State of Pennsylvania already initiated one suit to compel EPA enforce-
ment of proposed sulfur dioxide emission standards for Ohio at two plants owned by
Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. See [1980] 10 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) (10 Envir.
Rep. Current Dev.) 2093. The standards had been proposed by the EPA because of
Ohio's failure to propose adequate standards on its own initiative. See Cleveland
Elec. Mum. Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1150, 1156 (6th Cir. 1978), cer. denied, 439 U.S. 910
(1978) (upholding EPA's jurisdiction to establish state emission standards). Follow-
ing extreme political pressure, President Carter suspended application of the stan-
dards. See Dumanoski, supra note 2, at 44. The EPA subsequently enacted relaxed
standards, mooting Pennsylvania's objection to no emission controls at the two plants.
See [1980] 11 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) (11 Envir. Rep. Current Dev.) 270.
Controversy over air quality standards in Ohio nonetheless continues. The state
consistently has resisted the Clean Air Act. See Dumanoski, supra note 2, at 43. It
has the loosest emission limitations of any state, id. at 43-44, and has circumvented
the Act through encouragement of tall stacks. Id. at 44. Cf. [1979] 10 ENVIR. REP.
(BNA) (10 Envir. Rep. Current Dev.) 1544 (EPA allows Ohio power plants to bum
coal with six percent sulfur content, while Pennsylvania plants are limited to two and
one quarter percent). All EPA efforts to establish standards or designate areas of
Ohio as nonattainment under the Clean Air Act have encountered stiff resistance.
Private industry objections have created a protracted series of cases. See generally
Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. Costle, 632 F.2d 14 (6th Cir. 1980); General Motors
Corp. v. Costle, 631 F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1980); PPG Indus., Inc. v. Costle, 630 F.2d 462
(6th Cir. 1980); Republic Steel Corp. v. Costle, 621 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1980); Cincin-
nati Gas & Elec. Co. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 660 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. deniedl 439 U.S. 1114
(1979); Cleveland Elec. Mum. Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1150 (6th Cir. 1978), cer. denied,
sub noma. Timken Co. v. EPA, 439 U.S. 910 (1978).
63. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 8901-8905 (Pamph. 1980).
64. 126 CONG. REc. 516198 (remarks of Sen. Schmitt).
65. Id. at 516197 (statement of Sen. Moynihan).
66. Pub. L. No. 96-294, §§ 101-805, 94 Stat. 611-775 (1980) (codified in 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 8701-8912 and scattered sections of 7, 10, 12, 15, 16, 30, & 50 U.S.C.A.).
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national program for synthetic fuel development.67 In enacting the
acid rain provision, Congress evidenced concern that this synthetic
fuel program together with coal conversion will intensify the acid
rain problem.68
The Acid Precipitation Act establishes a ten-year program69 to re-
search the causes of acid rain70 and evaluate its social, economic, and
environmental effects.7 The Act provides for creation of an Acid
Precipitation Task Force to implement the ten-year program 72 and
prepare a comprehensive research plan.7" The comprehensive plan is
to delineate a coordinated program 74 identifying not only the causes
and effects of acid rain,75 but measures for limiting or ameliorating
its deleterious effects as well.76 Following a period for public review
and comment,7 the Task Force is to submit the comprehensive plan
to Congress and the President.78 The Act then directs the Task Force
to implement the plan throughout the course of the ten-year
program.
79
Although laudable, this statutory research program does nothing
for those parties presently beleaguered by interstate transport of acid
rain pollutants. It provides no substantive relief. Although the Task
Force is to identify within the comprehensive plan measures to lessen
or eliminate the harmful effects of acid rain, 0 the statute provides
The Energy Security Act was enacted in part to extend the Defense Production Act of
1950, 50 U.S.C. §§ 2061-2169 (1976).
67. United States Synthetic Fuels Corporation Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 8701-
8795 (Pamph. 1980).
68. 126 CONG. REc. 516198 (remarks of Sen. Heinz).
69. Acid Precipitation Act of 1980, § 703(a), 42 U.S.C.A § 8902(a) (Pamph. 1980).
70. Id. § 702(b)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 8901(b)(1) (Pamph. 1980).
71. Id. § 702(b)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 8901(b)(2) (Pamph. 1980).
72. Id. § 703(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 8902(a) (Pamph. 1980).
73. Id. § 704(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 8903(a) (Pamph. 1980).
74. Id. The Act seeks coordination of all current acid rain research efforts by
federal agencies and departments. Id. § 704(b)(10), 42 U.S.C.A. § 8903(b)(10)
(Pamph. 1980). It also encourages cooperative efforts with states and foreign nations.
Id. § 704(b)(1 1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 8903(b)(1 1) (Pamph. 1980).
75. Id. § 704(a)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 8903(a)(1) (Pamph. 1980).
76. Id. § 704(a)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 8903(a)(2) (Pamph. 1980).
77. Id. § 704(c)(1), (2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 8903(c)(1), (2) (Pamph. 1980).
78. Id. § 704(c)(3), 42 U.S.C.A. § 8903(c)(3) (Pamph. 1980).
79. Id. § 705(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 8904(a) (Pamph. 1980).
80. Id. § 704(a)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 8903(a)(2) (Pamph. 1980).
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nothing further. There is no authorization to implement or enforce
any such measure.
In its statement of purpose,8" Congress declared that action
deemed "necessary and practicable" based upon the findings of the
research program shall be taken "to the extent consistent with ex-
isting law."82 In Section 705(b), however, Congress in effect reversed
itself by prohibiting all regulatory activity under the Act, whether
consistent with existing law or not.8 3 Section 705(b) provides:
"Nothing in this subtitle shall be deemed to grant any new regulatory
authority or to limit, expand, or otherwise modify any regulatory au-
thority under existing law, or to establish new criteria, standards, or
requirements for regulation under existing law."84
This section eliminates the possibility of substantive action based
upon the research program's findings. Not only does it prohibit exer-
cise of new and modification of existing regulatory authority, it pro-
hibits incorporation of new criteria or standards within the existing
authority as well. Since the criteria and standards for regulatory con-
trol of acid rain are not contained within any existing authority,
85
there is no available procedure for implementing the research pro-
gram's findings. Before the Acid Precipitation Act can provide any
substantive protection from acid rain, therefore, Congress must act
further, either by amendment 6 or enactment of appropriate enabling
legislation.
B. Clean Air Act
1. Basic Regulatory Framework of the Clean Air Act
The Clean Air Act87 attempts to control and prevent air pollution
88
by addressing the effects of direct pollutant discharges upon local en-
81. Id. § 702(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 8901(b) (Pamph. 1980).
82. Id. § 702(b)(3), 42 U.S.C.A. § 8901(b)(3) (Pamph. 1980).
83. 42 U.S.C.A. § 8904(b) (Pamph. 1980).
84. Id.
85. See notes 113-43 and accompanying text infra.
86. Amendment could be either to the Acid Precipitation Act or the Clean Air
Act. Amending the latter to embrace acid rain has been proposed. [1980] 11 ENvIR.
REP. (BNA) (11 Envir. Rep. Current Dev.) 732. Industry mobilization to weaken the
Act during the 1982 legislative session will very possibly defeat any attempts to extend
it to cover acid rain. Id. at 84.
87. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. III 1979).
88. Clean Air Act, § 101(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(2) (Supp. III 1979). See New
England Legal Foundation v. Costle, 475 F. Supp. 425, 428 (D. Conn. 1979), aff'din
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vironmental quality 9 and human health and welfare.90 The Act's
basic regulatory framework to achieve these goals gives the states pri-
mary control over meeting federally-established air quality
standards.
The Act directs the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) to establish national primary and secondary ambient
air quality standards9' for each air pollutant he deems reasonably
likely to endanger public health or welfare.92 Ambient standards
presently exist for seven "criteria" pollutants.93
The states are responsible for attaining ambient standards for ex-
isting stationary sources. 94 Each state must develop a state imple-
mentation plan (SIP) for each criteria pollutant within nine months
of its designation.95 The SIP provides for implementation, enforce-
ment, and maintenance of both primary and secondary ambient stan-
dards within the state's air quality control regions.96 The SIP must
conform with certain federal requirements in meeting the stan-
dards.9 7 States have discretion, however, in both strengthening the
standards and distributing the burden of compliance.98
New or modified stationary sources must meet stricter nationally
uniform emission standards. These new source performance stan-
part, 632 F.2d 936 (2d Cir. 1980) (purpose of 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments is to
prevent and control air pollution).
89. Clean Air Act, § 101(b)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(3) (Supp. III 1979).
90. Id. § 101(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (Supp. III 1979).
91. Id. § 109, 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (Supp. III 1979). See generally W. RODGERS,
HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 224-30 (1977) (pre-1977 Amendments);
Kramer, The 1977 Clean Air Act Amendnents: A Tactical Retreat from the Technol-
ogy-Forcing Strategy? 15 URBAN L. ANN. 103, 109-26 (1978).
92. Clean Air Act, § 108(a)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(A) (Supp. III 1979). See
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 545 F.2d 320, 328 (2d Cir. 1976)
(Administrator has no discretion over whether to establish ambient standards; once he
determines a pollutant endangers public health or welfare, standards must be set).
93. The seven pollutants are: sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, total suspended
particulates, hydrocarbons, ozone, carbon monoxide, and lead. For a discussion of
the extent to which these standards have been met, see 9 COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMEN-
TAL QUALITY ANN. REP. 40-33 (1978).
94. Clean Air Act, § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7407(a) (Supp. III 1979).
95. id. § 110, 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (Supp. III 1979).
96. Id. § 110(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1) (Supp. III 1979).
97. Id. § I 10(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2) (Supp. III 1979). Each new or revised
SIP must be approved by the EPA. Id.
98. Id. § 116, 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (Supp. 1111979). See Note, Federal Common Law
Suits to Abate Interstate Air Pollution, 4 HARV. ENVT'L L. REV. 117, 119 (1980).
1981]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
dards (NSPS)9 9 require application of the "best demonstrated tech-
nological system of continuous emission reduction " "°° to effect an
overall percentage reduction in emissions.' 0 ' Nationally uniform
standards also exist for hazardous air pollutants (NESHAPS) 1°2 and
new motor vehicles.10
3
Areas with air quality better than ambient standards require re-
ceive special protection under the Act's Prevention of Significant De-
terioration (PSD) program. 3 " This program requires that each SIP
contain assurances that sulfur oxide and particulate concentrations
will not exceed maximum allowable levels'05 in the nation's clean air
regions.'0 6 An applicant for new construction of a major emitting
source within a clean air region must demonstrate the proposed
source will not cause cumulative emissions to exceed any of the Act's
requirements. 107
The Act contains two separate but interrelated provisions for con-
trol of interstate air pollution. Section 1 10(a)(2)(E) requires that each
SIP contain adequate assurances that in-state stationary sources do
not prevent any other state's attainment of national ambient air qual-
ity standards or interfere with its plan for PSD program compli-
99. Clean Air Act, § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (Supp. III 1979). See generally ROD-
GERS, supra note 91, at 267.
100. EPA: New Stationary Sources Performance Standards: Electric Utility
Steam Generating Units, 44 Fed. Reg. 33,579, 33,580 (1979).
101. Clean Air Act, § l1l(a)(1)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1)(C) (Supp. III 1979).
102. Id. § 112, 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (Supp. III 1979).
103. Id. § 202, 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (Supp. III 1979).
104. Id. §§ 160-169, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7479 (Supp. III 1979).
105. The Act specifies that both maximum allowable concentrations and maxi-
mum allowable increases over baseline concentrations shall not be exceeded. 42
U.S.C. § 7473 (Supp. III 1979).
106. Clean Air Act, § 163, 42 U.S.C. § 7473 (Supp. III 1979). The Act divides
clean air regions into three classes. Id. § 7472. Class I provides the most stringent
standards and applies to national parks, memorial parks, wilderness areas, and inter-
national parks. Id. § 7472(a). All other clean air regions receive initial designation as
Class II areas. Id. § 7472(b). States may redesignate certain areas to the most lenient
standard, Class III, pursuant to established standards. Id. § 7474.
107. Id. § 165(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(3) (Suppl III 1979). Under the precon-
struction review program, an applicant not only must show his facility will not cause a
violation of PSD increment levels, but also that it will meet all other Clean Air Act
requirements, including ambient standards. Id. Furthermore, the proposed source
must adopt the best available control technology for each regulated pollutant it will
discharge. Id. § 7475(a)(4).
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ance.'08 The SIP must also ensure compliance with section 126.09
That section mandates that a state include in its SIP provision for
written notice to all nearby states whose air quality may be affected
by new or existing major sources within its jurisdiction." 0 If, follow-
ing petition for review,"' the EPA Administrator finds interstate
transport will occur, he or she is to declare the polluter state's SIP in
violation of the Act." 12
2. Prospects for Control of Acid Rain Under the Clean Air Act
States," 13 environmentalists," 4 and the EPA" 5 recently have re-
viewed the Clean Air Act's provisions in an attempt to educe a viable
method of acid rain control. They have been unsuccessful. Although
both sulfur and nitrogen oxides, the principle precursers to acid rain,
are criteria pollutants for which ambient standards exist, the stan-
dards do little to eliminate the threat of acid rain. They are too leni-
ent, 116 allowing much higher emissions than achievable under
available best technology systems." 17 Moreover, they address ground
level concentrations, not cumulative high altitude atmospheric load-
ing. Acid rain, however, is a direct result of such long-term upper
atmosphere accumulations." 8
108, 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(E) (Supp. III 1979).
109. Id.
110, Clean Air Act, § 126(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7426(a) (Supp. III 1979).
111. Id. § 126(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7426(b) (Supp. III 1979).
112. Id. § 126(c), 42 U.S.C. § 7426(c) (Supp. 11 1979).
113. See, e.g., [1980] 10 ENvIR. REP. (BNA) (10 Envir. Rep. Current Dev.) 1928
(six Northeastern states petition EPA to increase regulation under Clean Air Act to
alleviate acid rain).
114. See, e.g., [1980] 10 ENvIR. RFP. (BNA) (10 Envir. Rep. Current Dev.) 2264
(NRDC issues recommendations to EPA for control of acid rain).
115, [1980] 11 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) (11 Envir. Rep. Current Dev.) 665 (EPA con-
siders use of Section 111 (d) of Clean Air Act to control acid rain).
116. Most air quality control regions can meet sulfur dioxide and nitrogen dioxide
ambient standards while still allowing substantial discharges. In fact, many states
have achieved nitrogen dioxide standards without establishing any existing stationary
source regulations. Westone, supra note 2, at 50004. Compliance with federal motor
vehicle emission controls alone suffices. Id.
117. See Costle, New Source Peiformance Standardsfor Coal-Fired Power Plants,
29 J. AIR. POLL. CoNT. A. 690 (1979) (existing power plants average 83 pounds of
sulfur dioxide discharged per ton of coal burned, while new facilities applying best
available technology will average 12 pounds per ton).
118. Wetstone, supra note 2, at 50005.
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State control over achievement of the ambient standards further
exacerbates the problem. Each state's primary objective in preparing
its SIP is to meet ambient standards within its own air quality control
regions." 19 Since it has discretion in distributing the burden of com-
pliance,2 o it distributes it relative to the importance of the emitting
source to its economy.' 2 ' The stringency of emission standards
among the various classes of emitting sources, therefore, is not uni-
form from state to state.122
State emphasis, moreover, concentrates upon minimizing local
ground level pollution. Dispersion techniques, especially the use of
tall stacks, are effective means of accomplishing this objective and
achieving ambient standards without significantly reducing total
emissions." 2 Tall stacks disperse pollution upward and away from
the emitting source, thereby contributing to both atmospheric loading
and long-range interstate transport. The 1977 Clean Air Act Amend-
ments limited employment of tall stacks, 2 4 however, thus restricting
their use for future dispersal purposes. 2 5
Both the new source performance standards and the PSD program
prospectively could assist in acid rain abatement. At present, how-
ever, neither is of benefit. The NSPS requirement that a new or mod-
ified source use the best available technological system promises a
long-term reduction in overall emissions. Since the average power
plant in the United States has twenty years of useful life remain-
ing,12 6 however, this policy will not produce significant reductions for
some time.
The PSD program provides assurances against interstate deteriora-
tion of clean air regions. 27 Furthermore, it seemingly covers dam-
ages inflicted by pollutants originating as air pollutants but which,
119, Clean Air Act, § l10(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1) (Supp. 111 1979).
120. See note 98 and accompanying text supra.
121. See Note, supra note 98, at 119-20.
122. Id. at 120.
123. Wetstone, supra note 2, at 50007.
124. Clean Air Act, § 123, 42 U.S.C. § 7423 (Supp. 111 1979).
125. The EPA has adopted a new policy on stack heights greatly restricting their
use. [1980] 11 ENvIR. REP. (BNA) (11 Envir. Rep. Current Dev.) 270. Before receiv-
ing a pollution reduction credit for increased stack height, a utility must demonstrate
that high pollutant concentrations at ground level warrant the extension. Id.
126. Wetstone, supra note 2, at 50007.
127. Clean Air Act, § 160(4), 42 U.S.C. § 7470(4) (Supp. III 1979). For an excel-
lent discussion of the policy underlying the PSD program, see Hines, A Decade of
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like acid rain, chemically transform into another medium prior to
causing environmental damage.' 28 The program's preconstruction
review requirements do not apply, however, to major sources located
in nonattainment areas polluting clean air regions of other states.
129
Interstate acid rains denigrating clean air regions are thus beyond its
prohibition.
The Act's interstate provisions conceivably ought to provide effec-
tive relief from interstate transport of acid rain pollutants. They do
not. Both sections 1 10(a)(2)(E) and 126 have severe substantive and
procedural limitations. Neither can overcome the lack of uniformity
in SIP's regarding emission standards for different classes of
sources.13 The sections apply only to interstate pollutants signifi-
cantly contributing to violations of national ambient or PSD stan-
dards.'' Some states however, have adopted stricter standards for
certain polluting sources. 1 2 Under the interstate provisions, those
states have no right to protect their standards against violations
caused by interstate pollutant transport.
13 3
The limitations inherent in the interstate sections go beyond appli-
cation to only the national standards. Section 1 l0(a)(2)(E) covers
only stationary sources.' 34 Interstate transport of motor vehicle pol-
lution is beyond its purview.135 Moreover, the notice provisions of
section 126 apply only to the even narrower class "any major
Nondegredation Policy in Congress and the Courts; The Erratic Pursuit of Clean Air
and Clean Water, 62 IOWA L. REV. 643 (1977).
128. Section 160 provides:
The purposes of this part are as follows: (1) to protect public health and wel-
fare from any actual or potential adverse effect which in the Administrator's
judgment may reasonably be anticipated to occur from air pollution (or from
exposures to pollutants in other media, which pollutants originate as emissions to the
ambient air), notwithstanding attainment and maintenance of all national ambi-
ent air quality standards;...
42 U.S.C. § 7470 (Supp. III 1979). (Emphasis added).
129. Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 606 F.2d 1068, 1076 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
130. See notes 119-22 and accompanying text supra.
131. Clean Air Act, §§ 110(a)(2)(E), 126, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410(a)(2)(E), 7426 (Supp.
III 1979). See 10 LAND USE & ENVIRONMENT LAW REVIEW 354 (F. Strom ed. 1979).
132. See [1980] 10 ENvIR. REP. (BNA) (10 Envir. Rep. Current Dev.) 1928
(Northeastern states object to interstate pollutant influx from states with higher power
plant emission levels); Note supra note 101, at 119.
133. See 10 LAND USE & ENVIRONMENT LAW REVIEW 354 (F. Strom ed. 1979).
134. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(E) (Supp. III 1979).
135. See Note, supra note 98, at 122.
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source."1 36 Cumulative upper atmosphere loading by a consortium
of smaller sources and major complying sources thus avoids the no-
tice requirement.
137
Implementation of the interstate provisions also presents procedu-
ral difficulties. Tracing pollutants from a specific major source in one
state to violation of a national standard in another may prove to be
extremely difficult. 138 Even after such a causal relationship is estab-
lished, section 126 does not adequately delineate which state ought to
bear the burden of control. It seemingly places the entire burden
upon the polluting state. 139 Since in-state sources are likely to be in
part responsible for the receptor state's nonattainment,140 such an al-
location is both disproportionately harsh and a disincentive to active
EPA enforcement of the section.
41
Acid rain thus evades effective control under the Clean Air Act. In
its present form the Act does not encourage efforts to contain inter-
state transport of air pollutants. Moreover, it limits EPA's enforce-
ment alternatives.' 42 Nonetheless, the potential for control exists. By
amendment the Act could encompass acid rain. It is doubtful such
an amendment is forthcoming.143 Whether it is or not, parties pres-
ently suffering from the acid effects of rain need not wait; a federal
common law remedy presently exists.
III. FEDERAL COMMON LAW OF NUISANCE
A. Development of the Doctrine
Since neither Congress nor the Constitution fully adopted English
136. 42 U.S.C. § 7426 (Supp. 1111979).
137. See 10 LAND USE & ENVIRONMENT LAW REVIEW 354 (F. Strom ed. 1979).
138. Cf. Citizens Ass'n of Georgetown v. Washington, 383 F. Supp. 136, 141-42
(D.D.C. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 535 F.2d 1318 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (injunctive
relief denied for violation of ambient standards caused by building construction).
139. Clean Air Act, § 126(a)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 7426(a)(1)(B) (Supp. II1 1979).
140. See [1980] 10 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) (10 Envir. Rep. Current Dev.) 2147-48
(fourty-four percent of acid rain falling in all Northeastern states but New York and
New Jersey caused by in-state sources; those two states receive all but twenty-eight
percent of their acid rains from outstate sources).
141. See 10 LAND USE & ENVIRONMENT LAW REVIEW 355-56 (F. Strom ed.
1979).
142. [1980] 10 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) (10 Envir. Rep. Current Dev.) 2327 (statement
by EPA Administrator Douglas Costle).
143. See note 86 supra.
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common law, '" United States common law derives from express ju-
dicial creation. Under the doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,
1 45
federal courts possess only limited lawmaking powers."4 Juridical
control over most traditional common law matters rests with the
states.' 47 Federal courts, therefore, do not have general jurispru-
dence to fashion federal common law.'14  As a result, "general" fed-
eral common law does not exist in the United States. 149
"Specialized" federal common law, however, does.'50 Although fed-
eral courts have exercised their lawmaking power rarely and in a re-
stricted manner, 15 1 they have fashioned federal common law
144. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 659 (1834).
145. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
146. Id. at 80. Accord, Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, - U.S.
_ 01 S. Ct. 1571, 1582 (1981).
147. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. at 78. Accord, D'Oench, Dubme & Co. v.
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447, 471 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring).
148. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, - U.S. , - 101 S. Ct. 1784, 1790 (1981);
D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447, 471 (1942)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
149. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. at 78. Accord, Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff
Materials, Inc., - U.S. -_ -, 101 S. Ct. 2061, 2067 (1981). In Erie, the Supreme
Court overturned the century old decision of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1
(1842), which held that federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction are free to form
an independent judgment concerning the state law they are applying. Id. at 19. The
Court stated:
Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Con-
gress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State. And whether the
law of the State shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest
court in a decision is not a matter of federal concern. There is no federal general
common law.
304 U.S. at 78.
150. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, - U.S. __, __, 101 S. Ct. 1784, 1801 (1981)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 308
(1947) (there remains after Eie a "law of independent federal judicial decision").
See Friendly, In Praise of Erie--And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 383, 405 (1964). That the Supreme Court in Erie did not intend to totally de-
stroy federal common law is evidenced by the decision the same day in Hinderlider v.
La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938), holding that federal
common law controls apportionment of interstate streams. See generally C. WRIGHT,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 253-86 (3d ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited
as WRIGHT].
151. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., - U.S. __, , 01 S. Ct. 2061,
2067 (1981); Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963). Cf. United States v.
Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 308 (1947) (freedom of federal courts to create com-
mon law is more modest than that of state courts).
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remedies in a number of special situations.' 52
Federal nuisance law is one such "special" field of common law.
The origin of the federal common law of nuisance dates back to two
early twentieth century Supreme Court decisions.'53 In Missouri v.
Illinois,15 4 the Court held that a state may claim relief under federal
common law from a nuisance caused by another state endangering
the health and comfort of its citizens.' 55 Although it denied relief in
this instance,'56 the Court stated that where injury is a real and im-
mediate threat it would grant an injunction.
The Court did issue an injunction a year later in Georgia v. Tennes-
see Copper Co.' 58 Georgia had filed suit alleging the copper com-
pany's sulfurous gas emissions were destroying crops, forests, and
152. See, e.g., Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 401 (1970)
(wrongful death recovery under general maritime law); United States v. Seckinger,
397 U.S. 203, 209 (1970) (interpretation of government contracts); Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964) (international relations); Textile Workers
v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957) (labor law); Priebe & Sons, Inc. v.
United States, 332 U.S. 407, 411 (1947) (government contracts); National Metropoli-
tan Bank v. United States, 323 U.S. 454, 456 (1945) (United States commercial paper);
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943) (United States com-
mercial paper); Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92,
110 (1939) (equitable apportionment of interstate waters); Ivy Broadcasting Co. v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co. 391 F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 1968) (interstate communica-
tions); United States v. Sillman, 167 F.2d 607, 613 (3d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335
U.S. 825 (1948) (tort claims of the United States). See generally Friendly, supra note
150 at 383.
153. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, - U.S. _, ., 101 S. Ct. 1784, 1801 (1981)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
154. 180 U.S. 208 (1901) (demurrer overruled); 200 U.S. 496 (1906) (decision on
the merits).
155. 180 U.S. at 241. The alleged nuisance involved pollution of interstate waters.
The Chicago Sanitary District, a corporation of the state of Illinois, constructed a
canal connecting Lake Michigan with the Mississippi River 43 miles north of St.
Louis. With the state's approval, the District began channeling raw sewage through
the canal. Missouri contended this threatened the health of St. Louis residents and
deprived the state of its right to use the river in its natural condition. Id. at 214-15.
Furthermore, Missouri alleged an increase in typhoid fever in St. Louis was attributa-
ble to the canal operation. 200 U.S. at 522-23.
156. 200 U.S. at 526. Relief was denied because the Court felt Missouri fell short
of proving the allegations of its complaint. Id. Moreover, Illinois introduced evi-
dence showing that the Missouri River was more polluted as it emptied into the Mis-
sissippi than were the waters from the canal. Id. at 525. The Court found this
evidence damaging both on the face of and in principle to Missouri's case. Id. at 526.
157. 180 U.S. at 248.
158. 206 U.S. 230 (1907), decree entered, 237 U.S. 474 (1915), modifled, 240 U.S.
650 (1916).
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orchards within the state. 159 Confronted with this situation bearing
striking similarity to acid rain, the Court found a state has extreme
rights in its capacity as a "quasi-sovereign" 6' over the air and earth
within its domain.' 6 ' These rights, the Court concluded, include the
right to demand they not be denigrated by sources beyond the state's
control.'62 Holding Georgia had sufficiently met its burden of
proof, 63 the Court extended the rule of Missouri v. Illinois to include
nuisances caused by private parties.' 64
Apart from a few rare instances of Supreme Court invocation, 65
the federal common law of nuisance lay dormant for over sixty years
following Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. The Tenth Circuit re-
vived it in 1971 in a controversy over interstate water pollution. In
Texas v. Pankey,6 6 Texas sought an injunction to stop New Mexico
ranchers from spraying a chlorinated camphene pesticide on their
lands. The state alleged rainfall runoff would cause pollution of
waters flowing into Texas. 167 In reversing the district court's dismis-
159. Id. at 236.
160. In its "quasi-sovereign" capacity a state has an interest behind and in-
dependent of its citizens' private claims to land and air. Id. at 237. Justice Holmes
did not explicate his reasons for adopting the term "quasi-sovereign." One writer has
suggested he did so in order to emphasize that states do not possess all the powers of a
sovereign. Comment, Federal Common Law: Judicially Established Effluent Standards
as a Remedy in Federal Nuisance Actions, 7 B.C. ENVIR. AFFAIRS 293, 299-300 n.56
(1978).
161. 206 U.S. at 237.
162. Id. at 238. The Court stated:
It is a fair and reasonable demand on the part of a sovereign that the air over
its territory should not be polluted on a great scale by sulphurous acid gas, that
the forests on its mountains, be they better or worse, and whatever domestic de-
struction they have suffered, should not be further destroyed or threatened by the
act of persons beyond its control, that the crops and orchards on its hills should
not be endangered from the same source.
Id.
163. Id. at 238-39.
164. Id.
165. See. e.g., New Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U.S. 473 (1931), modFfed, 290
U.S. 237 (1933), construed, 296 U.S. 259 (1935) (municipality's dumping of garbage at
sea an enjoinable nuisance under federal common law when it damages an adjoining
state's shores); North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923) (state's method of
draining water into interstate stream constitutes a public nuisance when lands of ad-
joining state become flooded as a result).
166. 441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971).
167. Id. at 237-38. The complaint alleged that use of the chemical pesticide Toxa-
phene by the defendants to eradicate range caterpillars would pollute the Canadian
River, an interstate waterway flowing from New Mexico into Texas. Id. Texas ar-
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sal for lack of jurisdiction, the court held a state has a common law
right of protection against improper impairment of its waters from
sources outside its province."'
A year later the Supreme Court expressly approved the Tenth Cir-
cuit's reasoning in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Illinois I). 169 Illinois
sought invocation of the Court's original jurisdiction' 70 for abate-
ment of interstate water pollution by several southern Wisconsin
communities. 7 ' Finding the case within the jurisdiction of the dis-
trict courts,' 72 the Court elected not to exercise its original jurisdic-
tion.173 Although the Court passed no judgment on the merits,
Justice Douglas' opinion categorically explicated the framework
within which federal common law arises.
gued this would improperly impair its right to natural enjoyment and use of the river.
Id. at 238. Moreover, it contended that the municipal water supplies of eleven mu-
nicipalities would become unusable. Id.
168. Id. at 240.
169. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
170. Illinois' motion to invoke the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction was
based upon art. II, § 2, cl. 2 of the Constitution. In part, that clause extends the
Court's original jurisdiction "to Controversies between two or more States;-between
a State and Citizens of another State .. " U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. Congress
has delineated those instances in which the Court's original jurisdiction is and is not
exclusive. 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (Supp. III 1979) reads in pertinent part:
(a) The Supreme Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all
controversies between two or more states.
(b) The Supreme Court shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of:
(3) All actions or proceedings by a State against the citizens of another State
or against aliens.
171. A mirror image of the nuisance complained of in Missouri v. Illinois, Chicago
here was on the receiving rather than the discharging end of a raw sewage-in-inter-
state waters controversy. Illinois alleged that raw sewage and other waste materials
were being discharged daily into Lake Michigan from four cities and two sewa/e
districts in the Milwaukee area. The state contended this created a public nuisance m
Illinois where such discharges were prohibited. 406 U.S. at 93.
172. 406 U.S. at 100. The Court determined the appropriate federal district court
had jurisdiction over the controversy under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (Supp. III 1979).
173. 406 U.S. at 108. In denying without prejudice Illinois' motion for leave to
file, the Court stated that if Illinois wished to amend its pleadings to include the State
of Wisconsin, the Court would entertain the suit. Id. at 97. Exercise of its original
jurisdiction would be mandatory under 18 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (Supp. III 1979). As it
stood, however, as a suit between a state and the political subdivisions of another,
exercise of its original jurisdiction is left to the Court's discretion under § 1251 (b)(3).
See note 170 supra. Traditionally, the Court's policy has been to invoke its original
jurisdiction sparingly. Utah v. United States, 394 U.S. 89, 95 (1969).
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The facts endemic to the particular case determine whether appli-
cation of federal common law is necessary.' 74 In some instances, the
need to fill the interstices of congressional enactments in a certain
field dictates its use. 175 In such cases, state law may be relevant, but
in the end federal law, in its common as well as statutory form, con-
trols. 17 6 In other instances, the presence of a federal question may
mandate a common law rule of decision. 177 Character of the parties,
though perhaps essential, is not controlling;17 the controversy must
either touch fundamental interests of federalism or invoke need for a
uniform federal rule of law.
17 9
Within these bounds, the Court found an interstate common law
already in existence.' 80 Boundary disputes often require a federal
common law decision rule; ls so too, escheat of intangible personal
property. 182 Equitable apportionment of water in interstate streams
174. 406 U.S. at 106. Accord, Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 618 (1945).
175. 406 U.S. at 103. Cf. First Southern Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. First Southern
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 614 F.2d 71, 73-74 (5th Cir. 1980) (federal common law applies to
fill the interstices of federal legislation when federal interest or policy so requires).
176. 406 U.S. at 102. Accord, Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457
(1957) (although federal law must govern, compatible state law may be considered to
effectuate the federal policy). D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.,
315 U.S. 447, 471-72 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring) (federal court sitting in non-
diversity case may look to state law and give it persuasive or even controlling effect,
but decision must rest upon federal law).
177. 406 U.S. at 105 n.6.
178. Id. at 105 n.6. See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 480 (1923) (al-
though a state may be a necessary party, its presence alone does not confer jurisdic-
tion; controversy must be within the contemplation of the Constitution's jurisdictional
grant).
179. 406 U.S. at 105 n.6. The Supreme Court has often referred to the need to
establish a uniform rule for controversies involving basic federal interests. See, e.g.,
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964) (federal interest in
international relations mandates application of federal common law); Clearfield Trust
Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943) (federal government's interest in the
commercial paper it prints is such as to establish federal common law); Hinderlider v.
La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1939) (uniform federal
law needed to protect federal interest in equitably apportioned interstate waters). See
generally P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 762-70 (2d ed. 1973).
180. 406 U.S. at 105.
181. See. e.g., Oregon exrel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429
U.S. 363, 375 (1977) (determination of state boundaries following change in stream
bed made by federal common law).
182. See Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674, 682 (1965).
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similarly raises a federal question.'83 To this list the Court added
interstate pollution, holding "[w]hen we deal with air and water in
their ambient or interstate aspects, there is a federal common
law . . 184
Continued applicability of this federal common law of interstate
pollution toward any particular pollution problem is not, however,
guaranteed. Federal common law submits to the paramount author-
ity of Congress.'85 The Supreme Court recognized in Illinois I that
subsequent congressional enactments may preempt the doctrine's use
in the field of water pollution.8 6 It will provide a remedy only so
long as neither comprehensive legislation nor authorized administra-
tive standards fill the field.' 87
In its recent rehearing of the Illinois-Milwaukee controversy, the
Court in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Illinois II) 8 held that such
preemption had in fact occurred in regard to effluent discharges in
interstate waters. 189 In an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, the Court
found that the 1972 Amendments to the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act (FW'PCA)' 9° established an "all-encompassing pro-
183. See, e.g., Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S.
92 (1939); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
184. 406 U.S. at 103.
185. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, - U.S. _, 101 S.Ct.
1571, 1583 (1981); New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 348 (1931).
186. 406 U.S. at 107.
187. Id. at 107 n.9; Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236, 241 (10th Cir. 1971). Accord,
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943) (federal common law is
resorted to in the absence of federal statute). The notion that an established federal
common law remedy may be supplanted by statue is not unique to the federal com-
mon law of nuisance. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, - U.S. ., ._, 101 S.Ct. 1784,
1791 n.8 (1981). The Supreme Court has often found that Congress has directly ad-
dressed an issue ordinarily governed by federal common law, thereby preempting
resolution of a particular controversy under the usual common law standards. E.g.,
Ohio v. Kentucky, - U.S. -, -, 100 S.Ct. 588, 589-90 (1980) (interstate boundary
dispute); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978) (maritime law);
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 565-66 (1963) (equitable apportionment of inter-
state waters).
188. - U.S. -_, 101 S.Ct. 1784 (1981).
189. Id. at _, 101 S.Ct. at 1792. See also Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v.
National Sea Clammers Ass'n, - U.S. ., ., 101 S.Ct. 2615, 2627 (1981) (federal
common law of nuisance entirely preempted regarding pollution of coastal waters by
Federal Water Pollution Control Act and Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuar-
ies Act of 1972).
190. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. 111 1979).
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gram" which fully occupies the field. 19" ' Emphasizing the compre-
hensive nature of the congressional regulatory scheme, 192 the Court
ruled there is no interstice to be filled by federal common law.193
B. Application of the Doctrine to Acid Rain
The federal common law of nuisance flourished following Illinois
I Numerous lower federal courts applied it in interstate water pollu-
tion contoversies.194 Commentators billed it a "revolutionary" devel-
opment in environmental law.' 95 No court invoked it, however, in
litigation over air pollution. None considered its applicability to acid
rain.
In Illinois H, the Supreme Court effectively overruled the line of
lower court decisions following Illinois I which applied the federal
common law of nuisance to remedy interstate water pollution contro-
versies. 96 The Court did not, however, undercut the doctrine's basic
structure. Nothing in the opinion is inconsistent with any of the
aforementioned Supreme Court decisions which delineated the doc-
trine's bounds. 197 It remains, therefore, a potent remedy in environ-
mental litigation. If its applicability to acid rain is adjudicated,
courts will find it does provide an equitable remedy. This is apparent
upon examination of a number of fundamental principles inherent
within it.
191. - U.S...._ 101 S.Ct. 1784, 1792-93 (1981).
192. Id. at 101 S.Ct. at 1793.
193. Id. at - 101 S.Ct. at 1795.
194. See. e.g., Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp., 619 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1980);
Committee for Consideration of Jones Falls Sewage System v. Train, 539 F.2d 1006
(4th Cir. 1976). Only a few courts invoked the doctrine in pollution controversies
regarding other than interstate waters. See United States v. Kin-Buc, Inc., No. 79-514
(D.N.J. 1981) (hazardous waste disposal); United States v. Solvents Recovery Service,
496 F. Supp. 1127 (D. Conn. 1980) (groundwater pollution).
195. See Note, Federal Common Law of Nuisance Reaches New High Water Mark
as Supreme Court Considers Illinois v. Milwaukee II, 10 ENVT'L L. REP. 10101, 10101
(1980).
196. See cases cited in note 194 supra.
197. See notes 153-187 and accompanying text supra. The Court rested its deci-
sion solely upon the statutory preemption language of Illinois I. Although the Court
emphasized the restrictive nature of the federal common law of nuisance to a greater
extent in Illinois H than it had in the earlier case, see - U.S. at , 101 S.Ct. at 1790-
91 (federal common law is a "necessary expedient" resorted to only when resolution
of a federal question not addressed by statute compels the Court to do so), the opinion
contains no indication that the doctrine's validity is dubious.
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1. Overriding Federal Interest
The Supreme Court in Illinois I emphasized that it will fashion
federal common law when there is an overriding federal interest in
doing so.' 98 This interest can arise either from need for a uniform
rule of decision' 99 or to settle a dispute affecting basic interests of
federalism.2 "° The Court determined that controversies over inter-
state and navigable waters raise such basic federalism interests.20 1
Subject to congressional preemption, therefore, creation of a public
nuisance within those waters falls within the Court's interstate com-
mon law.
20 2
Interstate air pollution also falls within that common law. Trans-
port of sulfuric and nitrogen oxides across state lines similarly
touches basic interests of federalism. In lllinois 1, the Court stated
that federal common law encompasses air in its interstate or ambient
facet as well as water.203 In fact, the Court treated as settled the
question of whether air pollution is included within the federal com-
mon law of nuisance.
In reaching its holding, the Court relied heavily upon Georgia .
Tennessee Copper Co., calling it "the leading air case" in federal
common law of nuisance litigation. °4 The Supreme Court in Geor-
gia v. Tennessee Copper Co., in granting Georgia's request for an in-
junction, recognized an overriding federal interest in abating
interstate air pollution.20  The states released their right to forcible
abatement of external nuisances upon establishing the federal union.
Protection of the union dictates, however, that its member states not
198. 406 U.S. at 105 n.6. Accord, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S.
398, 426 (1964); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 305 (1947). See also
WRIGHT, supra note 150 at 249.
199. 406 U.S. at 105 n.6. Accord, Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25, 29
(1977); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943).
200. 406 U.S. at 105 n.6. Accord, Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers,
- U.S..., -, 101 S.Ct. 1571, 1582 (1981); Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp.,
384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966); Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957).
See also Woods & Reed, The Supreme Court and Interstate Environmental Qualiy:
Some Notes on the Wyandotte Case, 12 ARIZ. L. REV. 691, 703-13
(1970).
201. 406 U.S. at 105. Accord, City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, - U.S..., 101
S.Ct. 1784, 1787, 1791 (1981).
202. 406 U.S. at 107.
203. Id. at 103.
204. Id. at 104.
205. 206 U.S. at 237.
[Vol. 21:143
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol21/iss1/4
ACID RAIN
be greatly polluted by sources beyond their dominion.20 6 Although it
had no right to abate the interstate nuisance under state law, as a
quasi-sovereign member of the union, Georgia nonetheless could re-
quest relief under federal common law. 07 Federal equity demanded
it.20 8
2. Statutory Preemption
Even though a particular interstate pollution problem may affect
federal interests to the extent of necessitating invocation of the fed-
eral common law of nuisance, the doctrine's applicability remains
subject to congressional supersession. In Illinois I, the Supreme
Court acknowledged that federal laws and regulations may preempt
use of the federal common law of nuisance.20 9 The Court found such
had not occurred with water pollution.2"0 Although Congress had
legislated extensively in regard to interstate and navigable waters, the
Court held those statutory remedies were not necessarily exclusive. 2"
Where complementary, the federal common law of nuisance supple-
ments them, providing additional federal remedies.212
In the wake of Illinois I, numerous lower federal courts held that
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972213 and
1977214 left federal nuisance law intact.215 Illinois II overruled those
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 238.
209. 406 U.S. at 107.
210. Id. at 103.
211. Id.
212. Id. The Court stated that the federal statutes, though not necessarily placing
bounds on the federal common law, may provide guidance in establishing its decision
rule. Id. at n.5. See also Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957)
(statutes expressly create some substantive law; common law creates that necessary to
resolve issues in the penumbra of the statutory mandates).
213. Pub. L. No. 92-500, amending 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1970 & Supp. III
1979).
214. Pub. L. No. 95-217, amending 33 U.S.C. § 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. III
1979).
215. See, e.g., Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 163 (7th Cir. 1979),
vacated, - U.S. _ - 101 S.Ct. 1784, 1800 (1981). (neither 1972 nor 1977 Amend-
ments preempt federal common law); Committee For Consideration of Jones Falls
Sewage System v. Train, 539 F.2d 1006, 1009 n.9 (4th Cir. 1976) (1972 Amendments
evidence congressional intent not to preempt federal common law); United States ex
rel. Scott v. United States Steel Corp., 356 F. Supp. 556, 559 (N.D. 11. 1973) (1972
Amendments meant to amplify and supplement preexisting remedies). But see
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decisions. The Supreme Court held that the 1972 Amendments pre-
empted the federal common law of nuisance.2" 6 The Court found
that the amendments differed in magnitude from the legislative
schemes it had before it to consider in Illinois 1.217 In enacting the
amendments, Congress expressed an intent to create a comprehensive
federal regulatory scheme.2 Is Contrary to Illinois I, therefore, the
Court in Illinois II found the field of federal control over effluent
discharges in interstate waters completely occupied by an "all-
encompassing" regulatory program.2  This program, the Court con-
cluded, totally supplanted application of the federal common law of
220nuisance.
No case has determined to what extent the Clean Air Act preempts
the federal common law of nuisance in regard to air pollution. Al-
though it is likely much of the field is preempted,22' several factors
educe the conclusion that all of it is not.
First, it is improper to presume that federal statutes and common
law are mutually exclusive. The Supreme Court has long been com-
mitted to a presumption that statutes encroaching upon the common
law retain familiar and long-established principles.222 Especially
United States v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 462 F. Supp. 1126, 1130 (E.D. La. 1977) (federal
common law nusiance remedy not available to preempt a remedy precisely and delib-
erately set by Congress in FWPCA).
216. - U.S. at_ 101 S.Ct. at 1792. Accord, Middlesex County Sewerage Auth.
v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, - U.S. 1, , 01 S.Ct. 2615, 2627 (1981).
217. - U.S. at -, 101 S.Ct. at 1792.
218. Id. at -, 101 S.Ct. at 1792-93.
219. Id. In Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n,
- U.S._, 101 S.Ct. 2615 (1981), the Court extended its holding in lllinois II to cover
effluent discharges into coastal waters. The Court expansively read Illinois 1I as
holding the FWPCA "entirely preempted" the federal common law of nuisance in the
field of water pollution. Id. at_, 101 S.Ct. at 2627. Such a broad reading of Illinois
II is inaccurate. Not only was the controversy in llinois HI limited to sewage dis-
charges, but the Court expressly restricted its holding to resolution of that issue. See
City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, - U.S. at - 101 S.Ct. at 1792-94 ("at least so far as
concerns the claims of respondents.., the problem of efuent limitations has been
thoroughly addressed through the administrative scheme established by Con-
gress.... Federal courts lack authority to impose more stringent effluent imitations
under federal common law than those imposed by the agency charged by Congress
with administering this comprehensive scheme."). (Emphasis added).
220. - U.S. at -, -, 101 S.Ct. at 1792, 1794.
221. See Washington v. General Motors Corp., 406 U.S. 109, 114-15 (1972) (con-
sidering extent to which Clean Air Act preempts state control over air pollution).
222. Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952).
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when a statute is of a remedial or amendatory nature,223 the Court
hesitates to repeal by implication existant common law remedies. 24
The Clean Air Act is a remedial, amendatory statute. The federal
common law of nuisance is an existent remedy for interstate air pol-
lution controversies.225 In considering the Act's preemptive effect
upon the common law, therefore, courts should refrain from over-
reading its encroachment. Judicial construction should effectuate a
statute's purpose.226 Only when that purpose is expressly incongru-
ous to the common law does a statute necessarily derogate it.227
Since the Clean Air Act's remedial purpose is consistent with applica-
tion of the federal common law of nuisance, courts should exercise
restraint in finding its provisions preemption thereof.
Second, one of the essential functions of federal common law is
filling in the penumbra of express statutory directives.228 Often a
congressional enactment will establish a broad policy framework.229
Although our tripartite form of government entrusts the judiciary
with only limited lawmaking power,23° the "specialized" common
law that has developed since Erie23 1 gives federal courts interstitial
decisionmaking power.232 Judicial inventiveness will be checked by
the nature of the subject matter.233 The courts will look to the under-
lying statutory policies and principles, fashioning appropriate federal
common law rules of decision. 3
223. Id.
224. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 437 (1907).
225. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907).
226. Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952).
227. Id.; Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 437 (1907).
228. United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 593 (1973); Tex-
tile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957).
229. E.g., Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457-58 (1957);
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1943); Board of Commis-
sioners v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 349 (1939).
230. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, - U.S. __, _, 101 S.Ct.
1571, 1582 (1981); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 313 (1947).
231. See notes 150-52 and accompanying text supra.
232. See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, - U.S. -, -, 101 S.Ct. 1784, 1801-02
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). See generally Friendly, supra note 150 at 405-22; Hill, The
Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional Preemption, 67 COLUM. L.
REV. 1024, 1026-42 (1967).
233. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1947).
234. See, e.g., Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 103 n.5 (1972) (federal
environmental protection statutes provide useful guidelines in establishing federal
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In Illinois II, the Supreme Court held that the nature of the 1972
Amendments to the FWPCA regarding effluent discharges is so com-
prehensive that it excludes all interstitial decisionmaking by federal
courts.23 Since the FWPCA and the Clean Air Act are complimen-
tary statutes employing similar pollution control principles and tech-
niques,236 it is surmisable that the reasoning of Illinois II could be
extended to the Clean Air Act.237 Such an extention would have no
bearing upon application of the federal common law of nuisance to
combat acid rain.
Illinois II concerned sewage discharges into a navigable water-
way. 231 Such discharges were precisely one of the forms of water
pollution Congress designed the FWPCA to control.239 The Act es-
tablished an elaborate permitting program regulating effluent dis-
charges.240 Congress considered this program an essential part of its
comprehensive scheme to eliminate water pollution.241 Although
nothing in the Act or its legislative history evidences an express con-
gressional intent to abrogate the established federal common law of
nuisance remedy, given the comprehensiveness of the statutory
scheme, retention of the remedy would have been supervenous.
Acid rain presents an entirely different situation. Congress
amended the Clean Air Act into its present form without giving acid
rain adequate consideration. It couldn't; the magnitude of the envi-
common law decision rule); Walis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 69
(1966) (federal statutes dealing with general subject matter are prime repositories of
federal policy and good starting points for fashioning federal common law); Textile
Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957) (federal common law remedy is
fashioned by reference to legislative policy).
235. - U.S. at _, 101 S.Ct. at 1794-95.
236. See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 17 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (judicial inter-
pretation of "endangering" under FWPCA deemed relevant to meaning of "endan-
ger" under Clean Air Act); NRDC v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 701-02 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(citizen suit provisions of the two Acts clearly parallel).
237. In one pre-11linoisII decision, the district court in New England Legal Foun-
dation v. Costle, 475 F. Supp. 425 (D. Conn. 1979), implied that an argument devel-
oped by analogy from the FWPCA may form a valid basis for holding that the Clean
Air Act has not preempted federal common law of nuisance remedies for air pollu-
tion. Id. at 441. It did not decide the question since the plaintiffs were precluded
from receiving equitable relief on other grounds. Id.
238. -U.S. at ..- , 101 S.Ct. at 1788.
239. Id. at _, 101 S.Ct. at 1794.
240. Id. at , 01 S.Ct. at 1789.
241. Id. at , 101 S.Ct. at 1793.
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ronmental threat of acidic precipitation was unknown.2 42
The Clean Air Act is designed to combat the air pollution
problems prevailing at the time of its enactment.243 Although by ad-
ministrative regulation it expressly addresses the pollutants most re-
sponsible for acid rain,24 it does so in a manner incongruous to
eliminating the problem. The Act is localized. It divides the country
into regions245 and classes246 and compels polluters within each area
to assist in reducing 247 or preventing an increase in 2 4 8 pollutant
levels. Only cursorily does it address pollutant transport across re-
gional or class boundaries.249
Interstate transport of acid rain circumvents this regulatory proce-
dure. In fact, the Clean Air Act exacerbates the problem.25 ° Its em-
phasis upon local ground level pollution encourages pollutant
dispersal outside the control area.25 This leads to upper atmosphere
accumulation and, consequently, to acid rain.25 2
Contrary to the situation present in Illinois HI, therefore, the Clean
Air Act does not preempt the federal common law of nuisance as to
acid rain. The Supreme Court in Illinois II found Congress had ex-
pressly designed a comprehensive program to eliminate the precise
form of water pollution at issue.2" Although the Clean Air Act is
also a comprehensive statute, it is not comprehensive regarding acid
rain. It is nugatory. It does not expressly address the problem, nor,
given its localized regulatory format, can coverage be found by
implication.
242. See H.R. REP. No. 95-294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 85-86, reprinted in [1977]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1077, 1163-64.
243. See notes 87-93 and accompanying text supra.
244. See National Primary and Secondary Ambient Air Quality Standards, 40
C.F.R. §§ 50.2-.10 (1981).
245. See notes 94-98 and accompanying text supra.
246. See notes 104-06 and accompanying text supra.
247. See notes 99-101 and accompanying text supra.
248. See notes 104-07 and accompanying text supra.
249. See notes 108-12 and accompanying text supra.
250. See Comment, The Great Clean Air Act Debate of 1981: Environmentalists,
lndusr'; Air Quality Commission Take Positions, 11 ENVT'L L. REP. 10027, 10031
(1981).
251. See notes 113-16 and accompanying text supra.
252. See notes 116-18 and accompanying text supra.
253. - U.S. at - 101 S.Ct. at 1792-94.
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3. Character of the Plaintiff
The Supreme Court in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. restricted
access to federal nuisance law to states. 4 Most lower federal court
decisions invoking the federal common law of nuisance have simi-
larly adopted this limitation.2 " Recent cases, however, presage its
eradication.256
The district court in United States v. Ira S, Bushey & Sons, Inc. 257
was the first court to permit a party other than a state to institute a
federal common law of nuisance claim.258 The Court granted the
United States leave to seek redress under the common law for oil
spills and seepage into interstate waters by a private party.259 Find-
ing substantial evidence of an overriding federal interest in interstate
waters,26° the court determined that denial of the common law rem-
edy would be iniquitous.26'
Numerous courts since Ira S. Bushey & Sons have recognized the
United States' right to initiate a federal common law of nuisance ac-
tion.262 Courts have been hesitant, however, to extend the doctrine to
non-sovereign plaintiffs. The first cases to break this barrier in-
creased the doctrine's scope to subsume municipalities 263 and state
254. 206 U.S. 230, 238 (1907).
255. See, e.g., Parsell v. Shell Oil Co., 421 F. Supp. 1275, 1281 (D. Conn. 1976),
a.ffdmetr sub noma. East End Yacht Club v. Shell Oil Co., 573 F.2d 1289 (2d Cir.
1977); Michie v. Great Lakes Steel Div., 495 F.2d 213, 216 n.2 (6th Cir. 1974) cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 997 (1974); United States v. Lindsay, 357 F. Supp. 784, 794
(E.D.N.Y. 1973) (dictum).
256. See cases discussed in notes 197-208 and accompanying text infra.
257. 346 F. Supp. 145 (D. Ct. 1972).
258. Id. at 150.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 149-50. The court educed this finding from executive statements, legis-
lative enactments, and administrative agency regulations as well as from judicial pro-
nouncements. Id.
261. Id. at 150.
262. See, eg., United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11 (D. Minn.
1974), modeed and remanded sub nom. Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (8th
Cir. 1974); United States ex rel. Scott v. United States Steel Corp., 356 F. Supp. 556
(N.D. IlM. 1973). But see United States v. Lindsay, 357 F. Supp. 784, 794 (E.D.N.Y.
1973) (dictum).
263. See City of Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, Inc., 604 F.2d 1008
(7th Cir. 1979); Township of Long Beach v. City of New York, 445 F. Supp. 1203
(D.NJ. 1978). See generally Comment, Seventh Circuit Interprets Federal Common
Law of Nuisance to Authorize Municipalities to Sue for Damages, 9 ENVT'L L. REV.
(1979).
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agencies. 2" To date, only one court has permitted its invocation by a
private party.
In National Sea Clammers Association v. City of New York,265
plaintiffs sought damages for economic injury resulting from the
city's dumping of sewage sludge into the Atlantic Ocean. Relying
upon traditional public nuisance law principles, the court determined
that the plaintiffs had standing under the federal common law of nui-
sance since they had suffered injury distinct from that of the general
public.266 In so holding, the court did not ignore the doctrine's re-
quirement of an overriding federal interest. Turning to dictum in
Illinois I, the court stated that need for uniformity in the doctrine's
application mandated extending its scope to include private par-
ties."' In fact, the court concluded, to give the doctrine full effect
private parties should be encouraged to use it.268
Whether other federal courts will follow National Sea Clammers is
debateable. If they do, the federal common law of nuisance will be
available for use by any party, public or private, injured by interstate
pollution. If not, private parties will have to rely upon their states for
protection.
In its parens patriae capacity, a state may file suit to protect the
general health, welfare, or property rights of its citizens.2 69 The
Supreme Court has held this rule applicable to nuisance claims aris-
ing under federal common law.27° The amount of relief available in
aparenspatriae suit, however, is limited. A state is not a full sover-
eign.27' It is a "quasi-sovereign," acting as guardian or trustee for its
citizens.2 Its interests, though lying behind those of its citizens,"
264. California Tahoe Regional Planning Agency v. Jennings, 594 F.2d 181 (9th
Cir. 1979) (state agency together with state).
265. 616 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Middlesex
County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, - U.S. _ 101 S.Ct. 2615
(1981).
266. Id. at 1234-35.
267. Id. at 1233.
268. Id. at 1234.
269. North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 375-76 (1923); Pennsylvania v.
West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 592 (1923).
270. See e.g., North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. at 375; Georgia v. Tennessee
Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
271. North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. at 376.
272. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. at 237; Louisiana v. Texas, 176
U.S. 1, 19 (1899).
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do not include an interest in the individual claims of each citizen as
against another state.274 For a state to sue another in itsparenspa-
triae capacity, its interests must not merely lie behind but be in-
dependent of those of its citizens.275 A state may not sue another,
therefore, merely to redress private grievances of its citizens.276
A suit for only economic damages such as those incurred by plain-
tiffs in National Sea Clammers is therefore beyond the scope of a
parenspatriae suit. If National Sea Clammers is not followed, private
parties injured by acid rain will be confronted with this limitation.
Acid rain's tendency to pervade state interest and arouse official con-
cern suggests, however, this limitation is no real prohibition.
A plausible claim of interstate acid rain pollution will of necessity
produce evidence of widespread damage. Although private land-
owners and entrepreneurs will sustain much of this damage, state
lands or structures also are likely to be directly affected. To the ex-
tent they are, the state may sue in its proprietary capacity. Where
not, its interest in protecting the health, welfare, and property of its
citizens will rise above mere questions of individual private rights.2 "
As the representatives of the collective, a state, moreover, has inter-
ests apart from those of particular individuals in maintaining a
favorable economic position and preventing or eliminating impedi-
ments to its growth and development.278 These indissoluble links be-
tween the interests of a state and its citizens provide the necessary
273. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. at 237.
274. North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. at 376.
275. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 258-59 n.12 (1972); Georgia v.
Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. at 237. See generally Note, State Protection of Its
Economy and Environment: Parens Patriae Suitsfor Damages, 6 Col. J. L. & Soc.
Prob. 411,412-13 (1970).
276. New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76, 91 (1883). Such suits are prohib-
ited by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution. That Amendment provides that
the federal courts may not hear any case "commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another State. .. ." U.S. Const. amend. XI. Thus, a
suit by a state under color of its quasi-sovereign interests but in essence designed to
recover a specific claim of one or a group of its citizens is not justiciable. New Hamp-
shire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. at 91. Moreover, although a state may be able to enjoin
another from causing a nuisance upon the private lands of its citizens, North Dakota
v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. at 374, it may not seek monetary compensation for that dam-
age already done. Id. at 376.
277. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 99 (1907).
278. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 268-69 (1972) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting); Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 451 (1945).
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incentives and justifications for it to sue asparenspatriae.279
4. The Availability of Injunctive Relief: Balancing the Equities
The federal common law of nuisance is a suit in equity.28° As
such, traditional equity limitations apply.28' An injunction should
issue only when the right to relief is evident,282 and the legal remedy
inadequate.283  The danger must be real and immediate,284 the in-
jury continuous or recurring.28 5 An injunction may not issue against
a nuisance for which the plaintiff is in part responsible.286 The bur-
den of proof is demanding,287 separating the noxious effects of multi-
279. See Wyoming v. Colorado, 286 U.S. 494, 509 (1932).
280. Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 244 (1901).
281. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 165 (7th Cir. 1979), vacated on
othergrounds, - U.S..- 101 S. Ct. 1784 (1981); United States v. Stoeco Homes, Inc.,
498 F.2d 597, 611 (3d Cir. 1974).
282. Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 248 (1901); Illinois v. City of Milwaukee,
599 F.2d 151, 165 (7th Cir. 1979), vacated on other grounds, - U.S. _, 101 S.Ct. 1784
(1981). See also Otaheite Gold & Silver Min. & Mill. Co. v. Dean, 102 F. Supp. 929,
934 (C.C.D. Nev. 1900) (equity should intervene only where substantial claim is
presented showing obvious violation of a right).
283. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 165 (7th Cir. 1979), vacated on
other grounds, - U.S. _ 101 S.Ct. 1784 (1981).
284. Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 248 (1901). Accord, New York v. New
Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 313 (1921) (threatened impairment of rights must be of serious
proportions and clearly established by evidence). Damage need not occur, however,
before equity may be granted. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 673 (1887). A
threatened nuisance may therefore be enjoined. Id.; California Tahoe Regional Plan-
ning Agency v. Jennings, 594 F.2d 181, 193 (9th Cir. 1979). See generally W. PROS-
SER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 603-04 (4th ed. 1971).
285. See Maryland Dep't of Natural Resources v. Amerada Hess Corp., 350 F.
Supp. 1060, 1068 (D. Md. 1972) (under federal common law, public nuisance is by
nature recurring or continuous). See also Matter of Oswego Barge Corp., 439 F.
Supp. 312, 322 (N.D.N.Y. 1977) (oil spill affecting navigable waterway for 122 days
cannot be considered not continuous or recurring and is therefore a federal nusiance).
286. See, e.g., Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 525-26 (1906) (injunction denied
in part because plaintiff equally if not more guilty of creating the nuisance).
287. A private party plaintiff must ordinarily show material harm has or is rea-
sonably certain to occur. See Wichers v. New Orleans Acid & Fertilizer Co., 128 La.
1011, 55 So. 657 (1911) (plaintiff satisfies burden to establish state nusiance when he
shows material destruction to his plants with defendant's factory the only polluting
source upwind). In suits between two states, a more stringent burden applies. North
Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 387 (1923); New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S.
296, 309 (1921) (clear and convincing evidence). See generally Comment, Federal
Common Law: Judicially Established Effluent Standards as a Remedy in Federal Nui-
sance Actions, 7 B.C. ENm. AFFAIRS 293, 304-06 (1978).
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pie sources laborious.288
These equity limitations severely restrict access to the federal com-
mon law of nuisance. They place a heavy burden upon a party seek-
ing its invocation. As regards acid rain, the burden, though arresting,
is not prohibitive. Tracing clouds of sulfurous gases to their emitting
sources may be arduous; it is not, however, impossible. Air monitor-
ing technology permits scrutiny of pollutant discharges from individ-
ual stationary sources, their dispersal into the upper atmosphere,
accumulation with other pollutants, and long distance transport.
Thus, although delineating which pollutants within a cloud
originated at which specific source within a large industrial area may
prove to be difficult, tracing the cloud to a specific industrial area and
hence to a minimal number of potential sources is not.28 9 A party
impacted by interstate acid rains, therefore, could satisfy the injury
burden of proof.2 90
"Balancing the equities" presents the most inhibitive equity limita-
tion upon use of the federal common law of nuisance to control acid
rain. Once a court finds a polluter has created a nuisance, it must
determine appropriate relief.2 91 Many courts have held an equitable
balancing of each party's interests must precede consideration of in-
junctive relief.292 The court must consider the relative economic im-
pact issuance or denial of an injunction will have on each party.293 It
must also take into account evidence of intentional misconduct by
either party, and consider the overall public interest.294
Courts conflict on whether the federal common law of nuisance
288. No court applying the federal common law of nuisance has dealt directly
with the issue of joint polluter liability. In Michie v. Great Lakes Steel Division, 495
F.2d 213, 216 (6th Cir. 1974), however, the Sixth Circuit held that under Michigan
nuisance law three corporations could be jointly charged for air pollution. Thirty-
seven Canadian plaintiffs had filed a diversity claim against the three corporations
alleging a single indivisible injury. .d.
289. See St. Louis Post-Dispatch, May 4, 1980, at 12A, col. 1 (sulfur oxide bearing
clouds followed from St. Louis to Minnesota).
290. See notes 29-44 & 52-56 and accompanying texts supra.
291. See Harrison v. Indiana Auto Shredders Co., 528 F.2d 1107, 1122 (7th Cir.
1976).
292. See, e.g., Sussex Land & Live Stock Co. v. Midwest Ref. Co. 294 F. 597, 609
(8th Cir. 1923); Bliss v. Washoe Copper Co., 186 F. 789, 827 (9th Cir. 1911), cert.
dismissed, 231 U.S. 764 (1913).
293. See PROSSER, supra note 281, at 603-04.
294. Id.
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should embrace balancing. Some hold equity demands it.295 Others,
recognizing equity to a polluter is given at the expense of the party
suffering the effects of the pollution, hold equity is defeated by bal-
ancing." In either case, when the pollution is shown to endanger
public health, courts find balancing improper.297
Justice dictates that in applying the federal common law of nui-
sance to interstate acid rain, courts should seldom, if ever, balance
the equities. Acid rain is not merely an environmental problem. It
inhibits economic growth.298 It curtails industrial development,299
destroys certain ways of life." ° It is a threat to public health.30 ' As
guardian of its citizens' health and welfare, a state is empowered to
sue another state or parties therein to redress grievances in which it
holds an interest. When it does, balancing is less important.302 A
state has an interest in the purity of the air,3 °3 land,304 and water
305
295. See, e.g., United States v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 498 F.2d 597, 611 (3d Cir.
1974) (dicta) (balancing necessary when applying federal common law of nuisance);
Sussex Land & Live Stock Co. v. Midwest Ref. Co., 294 F. 597, 609 (8th Cir. 1923)
(injunction denied since injury only partial and polluter using all available methods
to halt oil loss); Bliss v. Washoe Copper Co., 186 F. 789, 827 (9th Cir. 1911), cert.
dismissed, 231 U.S. 764 (1913) (injunction denied since loss to company would greatly
exceed plaintiff's injury).
296. See, e.g., American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Godfrey, 158 F. 225,230(8th Cir.
1907), cert. denied, 207 U.S. 597 (1907) (fact that business is conducted in a reasonable
and fair manner is irrelevant; injunction must issue to halt property damage and
health threat from its operations); United States v. Luce, 141 F. 385, 416 (C.C.D. Del.
1905) (when right to relief is clear and injury sustained substantial, denial of an in-
junction by balancing defeats equity); McCleary v. Highland Boy Gold Min. Co., 140
F. 951, 952 (C.C.D. Utah 1904) (property of one of small means must not be forcibly
taken by balancing equities against the wealthy).
297. In granting relief for pollution of interstate waters as a federal common law
nuisance, the Seventh Circuit in llinois v. City ofMilwaukee stated, "if the pollution
endangers the public health, injunctive relief is proper, without resort to any balanc-
ing." 599 F.2d at 166. Accord, Harrison v. Indiana Auto Shredders Co., 528 F.2d
1107 (7th Cir. 1976) (state nuisance).
298. See note 55 supra.
299. See note 54 supra.
300. See note 56 supra.
301. See notes 33-44 supra.
302. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230,238 (1907); Illinois v. City of
Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 166 (7th Cir. 1979), vacated on other grounds, - U.S.
101 S.Ct. 1784 (1981).
303. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907).
304. Id.
305. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 107 (1972).
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within its domain. Acid rain denigrates them all. To balance a pol-
luting state's or private party's economic interests against the multiple
interests of the receptor state is a judicial usurpation of a state's
parenspatriae interests.
CONCLUSION
Acid rain knows no jurisdictional bounds. Harmful to both urban
and natural environments, acid rain threatens long-term devastation,
much of which is irreversible. Current pollution control laws do not
adequately address it. The Acid Precipitation Act of 1980 is a valua-
ble research measure, but substantively devoid. The Clean Air Act,
with its emphasis upon local ground level concentrations, not only
does not address acid rain but increases the upper atmosphere pollu-
tant loading which creates the interstate acid rain problem.
The federal common law of nuisance offers relief from the phe-
nomenon. Though long quiescent, it has recently emerged as a viable
form of pollution control. Federal courts have applied it in numer-
ous water pollution controversies. Although the Supreme Court has
determined that statutes preempt it as to certain forms of water pollu-
tion, the Court's reasoning is not applicable to acid rain. The Clean
Air Act, therefore, is not preemptive. Whether suit be by state or
private party, acid rain's harmful interstate effects create the requisite
overriding federal interest. Protecting public health and welfare
within the receptor state demands that equity not consider the pol-
luter's economic interests. The federal common law of nuisance, in
other words, encompasses acid rain. It is available for judicial
cognizance.
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